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Drafting Under the UPOAA: Safeguarding Against
Elder Financial Exploitation Without
Compromising Autonomy
Jessica A. Liebau*
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of financial elder exploitation has resulted in a rush
of legislation and policies aimed at “protecting elders.” Often this protection is at the expense of an elder’s right to autonomy and runs contrary to their estate planning. Attorneys can utilize the Uniform Power
of Attorney Act, paired with appropriate drafting around certain default
provisions, to help clients strike their desired balance between protection from financial exploitation and protection against unnecessary intrusion into their private affairs.
In 2017, approximately 5,500 estate tax filers had taxable estates.1
In that same year, 63,500 Suspicious Activity Reports were filed for suspected elder exploitation, 80% of which involved actual monetary loss
to the elder at an average loss of $34,200.2 Yet, when discussing threats
to a client’s estate plan, attorneys often emphasize transfer taxes while
disregarding elder abuse. Estate planning attorneys must be able to discuss this risk with clients and craft appropriate safeguards.
When an agent under a financial power of attorney (POA) document is suspected of exploiting the principal, the Uniform Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA) provides an avenue for judicial relief.3 However,
the default process under the UPOAA can be cumbersome, leading to
excessive litigation and unnecessary guardianship. Proper drafting of a
financial POA can bolster the default protections under the UPOAA
while preserving the elderly client’s right to self-determination.
* Mequon, Wisconsin.
1 TAX POL’Y CTR., THE TAX POLICY CENTER’S BRIEFING BOOK 407 tbl.1 (2020),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/tpc_briefing_book_2020
.pdf.
2 CONSUMER PROT. FIN. BUREAU, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS ON ELDER FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS 3, 6 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/documents/cfpb_suspicious-activity-reports-elder-financial-exploitation_report.pdf.
3 UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 116 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2006).
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II. ELDER FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION
A. Population Affected
Elder financial exploitation, or the taking of the assets of an elderly
client for the perpetrator’s own personal benefit, affects an estimated 1
in 20 older adults.4 However, according to a comprehensive study of
elder abuse in New York State, for every 1 case of elder abuse reported,
44 cases go unreported.5 This can then be applied to an estimated 52
million U.S. residents over age 65 as of 2018, projected to grow to 95
million by 2060.6 Nationally, the cost of elder financial exploitation is
estimated to be at least $2.9 billion and as much as $36.5 billion annually.7 In addition, financial exploitation is linked to increased rates of
hospitalization, nursing home admission, and death.8
B. Perpetrator Characteristics
The majority of elder financial exploitation is at the hands of a family member or other trusted person.9 When an older adult is exploited
by someone known to them, the loss is greater than when the perpetrator is a stranger.10 When the perpetrator is a fiduciary of the victim, such
as an agent or guardian, the average loss is $83,600 per older adult.11
C. Legislative Responses
The Senior Safe Act, federal legislation signed on March 24, 2018,
aims to promote the reporting of financial abuse by providing immunity
from liability to covered entities who make reports of suspected abuse
“in good faith,” “with reasonable care,” and pursuant to a training pro4 Elder Financial Exploitation, NAT’L ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVS. ASS’N, https://
www.napsa-now.org/get-informed/exploitation-resources [https://perma.cc/LEV4-4TUS].
5 Lifespan of Greater Rochester Inc. et al., Under the Radar: New York State Elder
Abuse Prevalence Study, OFF. CHILD. & FAM. SERVS. 50 tbl.18 (2011), https://ocfs.ny.gov/
main/reports/Under%20the%20Radar%2005%2012%2011%20final%20report.pdf.
6 MARK MATHER ET. AL., FACT SHEET: AGING IN THE UNITED STATES, 70 POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU 2-3 (2015), https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
01/aging-us-population-bulletin-1.pdf.
7 Katherine Skiba, Older Americans Hit Hard by Financial Fraud, AARP (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-2019/cfpb-report-financial-elderabuse.html [https://perma.cc/E2ZA-8KPL].
8 MARIE-THERESE CONNOLLY, ET AL., THE ELDER JUSTICE ROADMAP: A STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVE TO RESPOND TO AN EMERGING HEALTH, JUSTICE, FINANCIAL AND
SOCIAL CRISIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 4 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/elderjustice/
research/resources/EJRP_Roadmap.pdf.
9 NAT’L ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVS. ASS’N, supra note 4.
10 CONSUMER PROT. FIN. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 18.
11 Id. fig.9.
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gram.12 Many state proposals go much further. For example, legislation
proposed in Wisconsin would permit a financial institution to freeze accounts and disregard financial POAs for any individual over age 60
when elder abuse is suspected, without any requirement that the financial institution document the basis for its suspicion.13 Such “protective”
provisions could undeniably curb an individual’s right to manage their
own property solely based on age and quickly undo their estate plan in
favor of guardianship without any evidence of abuse whatsoever.
Guardianship, long considered by government agencies to be the standard protection against financial exploitation, carries its own risks.
Aside from a substantial loss of constitutional rights, evidence indicates
guardianship is often used to further abuse rather than thwart it.14
III. RELIEF UNDER UPOAA
A. In General
Estate planners have long promoted powers of attorney as the way
to avoid the removal of rights and autonomy that guardianship entails.
Versus a guardianship or conservatorship, where the court-appointed
decisionmaker is charged with protecting the ward’s “best interest”
under a theory of parens patrie,15 an agent under a financial POA is
charged with exercising their power according to the reasonable expectations of the principal.16 Currently, 28 states base their power of attorney statutes on the UPOAA.17 However, relying on the default
provisions of the UPOAA may not provide the necessary safeguards
against financial exploitation.
B. Section 114 Accountings
Under Section 114 of the UPOAA, an agent is required to keep a
record of “receipts, disbursements, and transactions made on behalf of
12 Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, & Consumer Protection Act of 2018, Pub.
L. No. 115-174, § 303, 132 Stat. 1296, 1335-38 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 3423).
13 Financial Exploitation of Vulnerable Adults, Assemb. B. 481, 104th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wis. 2019).
14 Susan M. Collins & Robert P. Casey, Jr., Ensuring Trust: Strengthening State Efforts to Overhaul the Guardianship Process and Protect Older Americans, U.S. SENATE
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING 1, 14 (Nov. 2018), https://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Guardianship_Report_2018_gloss_compress.pdf.
15 See Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process and Protective
Proceedings, 2 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 13, 16 (2000).
16 UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2006).
17 Power of Attorney Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/commit
tees/community-home?CommunityKey=b1975254-8370-4a7c-947f-e5af0d6cb07c [https://
perma.cc/SMT5-YHQF].
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the principal.”18 However, the agent is not required to disclose that accounting during the lifetime of the principal unless ordered by a court or
demanded by the principal, a guardian, conservator, another fiduciary
for the principal, or a government agency charged with protecting the
welfare of the individual.19
C. Section 116 Review of Agent Conduct
Section 116 of the UPOAA provides that a broad list of individuals
may petition a court to construe a POA or review the agent’s conduct,
including a parent, spouse, or descendants of the principal, an individual
who would qualify as a presumptive heir, any person named as beneficiary to receive any property upon the principal’s death, and the seemingly catch-all category of “another person that demonstrates sufficient
interest in the principal’s welfare.”20 This permits a party to obtain judicial relief when an agent financially exploits a principal.
D. Limitation of Action Under UPOAA
The UPOAA process falls short in several aspects. Under Section
114, there is no deadline for providing the accounting after a request is
made. More importantly, in cases where a client executes a financial
POA and health care POA, names the same agent for both and then
becomes incapacitated (a common scenario), there is no party who can
request an accounting. A government agency could choose to investigate if actually alerted to the issue. In most cases where a financial institution suspects elder financial exploitation, a Suspicious Activity Report
is filed with federal authorities but not shared with local agencies.21
Therefore, in these types of cases, the UPOAA protects the privacy of
the client but also that of the agent/abuser.
Under Section 116, a non-agent child of the principal can petition
the court to review the agent’s conduct and simultaneously request an
accounting. However, if an accounting is ordered under Section 116 and
no wrongdoing is discovered, litigation is fruitless despite time and
money expended. If an accounting is ordered and wrongdoing is discovered, a substantial amount of time likely passed from the initial exploitation to the court order, making recovery of funds unlikely. Also, a court
may simply refuse to order an accounting at all.22
18

UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(b)(4).
Id. § 114(h).
20 Id. § 116(a).
21 CONSUMER PROT. FIN. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 25.
22 See Fetters v. Duff, 107 N.E.3d 627, 631 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018); Robbins v. Foseid,
871 N.W.2d 693 (Table), ¶¶ 31-34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015).
19
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This interplay of Sections 114 and 116 is explained in Colburn v.
Cooper.23 A third party filed an action to review the conduct of the
agent and demand an accounting. The agent moved to dismiss on
grounds that the third party lacked standing to request an accounting.
On appeal, the court specified that the third party did indeed have
standing.24 Even though she was not one of the parties who could request an accounting under Ohio’s version of UPOAA Section 114,25 she
could use the Section 116 process, get the court order, and then receive
the accounting to pursue her action for wrongdoing against the agent.26
She obtained her desired outcome, but only after substantial effort and
expense.
Litigating to request a simple accounting can also drive up the cost
of proving financial exploitation because the default rules under the
UPOAA do not hold an agent financially responsible for legal fees short
of a finding of misconduct.27 In In re Estate of Carpenter,28 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was asked to rule on $25,000 of legal fees incurred
by an agent to defend a petition to review her conduct. The principal
died before a decision was reached. Because the court did not find
wrongdoing, fees incurred by the agent were paid out of the principal’s
assets, not the assets of the agent.29 The lower court severely reduced
the allowable fees on grounds the case had been “substantially overlitigated,” but that ruling that was ultimately overturned.30 Therefore,
faced with the steep expense of litigation, many third parties simply will
not take the risk of starting an action, and abuse will continue
unchecked.
IV. DRAFTING

TO

STRENGTHEN CLIENT PROTECTIONS

A. Adding Teeth to the Accounting Requirement
One practical way to add additional protection to the UPOAA’s
default accounting rule is to include a provision that the agent shall provide an accounting to a specific person or category of persons, including
a specific deadline for providing the accounting and a statement in the
document that one purpose of the POA is to prevent financial mismanagement. The failure to abide by said accounting requirements could
23

Colburn v. Cooper, No 2018-L-008, 2018 WL 6722664 *1, *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App.

2018).
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at *3.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.34 (West 2020).
Colburn, 2018 WL 6722664 at *3-4.
UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 117 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2006).
879 N.W.2d 127 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 127, 129.
Id. at 128-29, 131.
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then constitute “reckless indifference to the purpose of the power of
attorney.”31 Per Section 115 of the UPOAA, this would supersede any
language in a POA document relieving the agent of liability, meaning
the third party could demonstrate agent misconduct without waiting for
a full accounting to be requested, court-ordered, completed, and
analyzed.
Clients often nominate co-agents as a purported check and balance.
However, this begets an entirely new set of issues. Co-agents must either
act concurrently with the potential of deadlock or inefficiency, or act
independently with the potential for one agent to “go rogue.”32 These
issues were highlighted in the Florida Court of Appeals case of
Rosekrantz v. Feit.33 One co-agent simply refused to authorize the release of information to the other co-agent, necessitating a court order to
investigate potential wrongdoing of the agent. The co-agency failed on
three counts: thwarting exploitation, avoiding court intervention, and
keeping the co-agents accountable to one another.34
B. Addressing the Gifting Issue
Questions around gifting powers are common in POA misconduct
cases, particularly self-dealing by the agent. Gifting of assets by a POA
does require a specific grant of authority written into the document
under the UPOAA.35 However, when a gifting provision is drafted
broadly, the agent may engage in substantial self-dealing and exploitation without running afoul of the document. The language of the document must then be measured against the requirement in Section 114 of
the UPOAA that an agent act in the best interest of the principal when
the principal’s reasonable expectations are not clear.36
Gifting provisions in a POA are often appropriate and desired by
the principal, but the provisions should be drafted no broader than the
client’s anticipated needs. If gifting for purposes of Medicaid eligibility
is a concern, it is unlikely that the client has an estate that would necessitate annual exclusion gifting. A POA including both types of gifting
powers may empower an agent to give himself $15,000 per year from a
very modest estate contrary to the principal’s expectations and interests.
In that scenario, self-dealing by an agent for Medicaid planning could be
permitted but limited by the requirement of obtaining prior advice of
counsel. Because a review of agent’s conduct relies heavily on the inten31
32
33
34
35
36

UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 115(1).
Id. § 111(a).
81 So. 3d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 528-29.
See In re Estate of Lambur, 397 S.W.3d 54, 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
Cisneros v. Graham, 881 N.W.2d 878, 887 (Neb. 2016).
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tion of the principal as set forth in the document, precise drafting can
clarify the principal’s intentions and avoid costly disagreements. This
also shuts down the “I didn’t know I couldn’t do that” defense to financial exploitation allegations.
V. SUMMARY
A client who chooses to include enhanced accounting and reporting
requirements in their POA document does give up some privacy in the
name of protection from financial exploitation. However, clients give up
control of assets in the name of transfer tax planning all the time, despite transfer tax liability being considerably less prevalent than financial exploitation. Guardianships and elder abuse legislation may force
the client to forfeit financial autonomy without a proportional increase
in protection against abuse. Customizing UPOAA provisions to match a
client’s risk tolerance can preserve autonomy and provides protection
from abuse. The solution does not need to be worse than the problem.

